Consists of Andrew’s Speech in Parliament in support of the Bill
and Andrew's Additional Notes on the Bill
ANDREW’S SPEECH IN HANSARD FOR PRIVATE MEMBER’S BILL
AUSTRALIAN BILL OF RIGHTS BILL 2001
As published in the House of Representatives Hansard
Dr Andrew Theophanous (Calwell) (1.16 p.m.) --This Australian Bill of Rights Bill 2001 is for an act relating to the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Australians and all people in Australia, and for related purposes. This is the first time in 12 years that such a bill has been presented to this House, and it is long overdue for consideration and implementation by this parliament.
It is a reflection of the current state of our liberal democracy that Australia is one of very few western nations that has not successfully entrenched the protection of internationally recognised human rights through either legislative or constitutional means.
Over the past 30 years, there have been several attempts to implement such a bill of rights in Australia. Between 1973 and 1988, there were four different failed attempts at the creation of a bill of rights by the Australian Labor Party, all of which were opposed by the coalition parties. However, since that time, the issue has generally been abandoned. One reason for this is that, as most political commentators have observed, there has been a marked movement towards authoritarianism and away from human rights issues in the last few years.
In contrast to previous attempts, this bill has been drafted in an extremely simple and intelligible manner. The fundamental objects of this bill are to promote universal respect for human rights and to enhance the dignity of the human person and equality of opportunity for all as paramount objectives of this legislature. Thus, one goal of this bill is to give effect to certain provisions of international treaties that Australia has been forthright in supporting on the international stage but has never incorporated into domestic legislation.
A large part of this bill is based on the bill introduced into this House by the then Labor Attorney-General, Lionel Bowen, in 1985 and embodies within it the fundamental principles of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. In this new bill, we also draw on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and, for the first time, seek to introduce social and economic rights into the domestic human rights agenda. In drafting this bill, we have also learnt some lessons from the various bills of rights of the UK, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. We have tried to incorporate the finest thinking in relation to the philosophy of democracy and the practice of human rights.
The bill has been extensively researched for a number of months, including with major assistance from my staff, Josh Bihary and Lauren Joffe, the Parliamentary Library's Dy Spooner and, from the Clerks Office, Claressa Surtees. Included with the bill are 17 pages of explanatory memorandum. The bill I am putting forward today has significant similarities to that drafted by the Australian Democrats. However, there are also important differences from their original draft, which we understand is to be radically amended.
The Australian Bill of Rights Bill 2001 begins with a guarantee of rights and freedoms, which proclaims that every person is `entitled to rights and freedoms without distinction', and is divided into key sections such as the guarantee of rights and freedoms (division 1), fundamental freedoms (division 2), equality of rights (division 3), civil and democratic rights (division 4), economic and social rights (division 5), and legal rights (division 6).
There are 43 articles that embody such principles as article 6, freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief; article 7, right of peaceful assembly; article 10, rights of indigenous peoples; article 11, rights of minority groups; article 14, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment; article 15, freedom from slavery, servitude and forced labour; article 18, rights of the child; article 24, right to live in a safe society; article 26, right to education; and so on.
These articles, if implemented, would, by their very nature, require an expansion in the powers of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. This has been dealt with in part 3 of the bill.
Section 10 of this bill provides new and important provisions with respect to the power of enforcement in human rights. On the one hand, the bill does not impose penalties on individual persons in either civil or criminal proceedings. On the other hand, groups of persons or incorporated bodies, while they will not be liable to criminal proceedings, can be liable for civil actions if they infringe human rights. In particular, an aggrieved person will be able to take action, after consultation with the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, to achieve an injunction to prevent the operation of a governmental decision that is contrary to the bill of rights.
This, therefore, extends into practice the theory that a bill of rights should act primarily as a shield rather than a sword. On the other hand, it needs to be more than a toothless tiger. On balance, this bill will serve to protect individuals and minority groups from discrimination and inequity--while at the same time allowing for a free society.
Furthermore, as the bill is statutory rather than constitutional, it ensures that the judiciary cannot overexercise its mandate, as the parliament will still have a fundamental element of control. In overall terms, the bill will act as a social charter for the Australian community to live by and respect.
One of the new and substantial improvements on previous bills is the introduction of social and economic rights into the agenda. Although these rights are part of United Nations treaties that Australia has signed, there has not been any previous attempt to incorporate them into legislation. When I was a parliamentary secretary in the Keating government, I produced many papers on the need for social and economic rights in this country. This is because they are an essential element of the very concept of social justice, and very important to social justice strategies for any humane government.
In this bill, I have included the right to the protection of property, to a decent standard of living, to live in a safe society, to adequate child care, to work, to education, and, in general, to individual and collective development. These are based on the UN charter and are also supported by the general arguments in my 1994 book Understanding social justice: an Australian perspective. There are two that need to be further explained. The adequate standard of living includes sufficient food and water, clothing and housing, access to health services, and access to social security. It requires the Commonwealth and state governments to take reasonable legislative measures to provide for the progressive realisation of each of these rights. The right to individual and collective development includes support for people to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.
One reason why all comparable Western nations have a bill of rights is because they have accepted that it is an essential element of a mature and functioning democracy. In other words, the very idea of democracy involves the recognition of certain inalienable rights for all persons. The concept of rights has been embodied in all the philosophical discussions of the meaning of modern democracy. John Stuart Mill identified the essence of modern democracy as being intertwined with fundamental human rights. As he said in his book On Liberty:
Society can and does execute its own mandates, and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.
In this eloquent passage, Mill identified the absolute and crucial need for rights and the guarantee of rights in the constitution and laws of any country that is a genuine democracy. It is imperative that this government work to achieve the ideals established in the philosophy and to protect the minority groups from which this nation was forged. This can only be achieved through the implementation of a bill of rights.
Another crucial reason for a bill of rights is the need for Australians to show that they have a genuine commitment to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In modern-day global politics, when discrimination and human rights breaches occur, the United Nations has been forthright in its public comment and criticism. In this regard, Australia has committed itself to the United Nations, and this commitment carries certain responsibilities. Australia has supported and ratified a number of UN treaties, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the treaty on racial discrimination and the treaty on the rights of the child. Unfortunately, this formal commitment has not been accompanied by concrete action by this government. It is a tragedy that the government recently ceased cooperation with the bodies that were forged from the UN human rights treaties.
Furthermore, the government now seeks to abolish even the limited reference to the external power, which has been used to give international treaties some weight in the courts, and, therefore, provide some human rights to Australians. The Administrative Decisions (Effect of International Instruments) Bill 1999—sometimes known as the Teoh bill--is intended to abolish the ability of the courts to act on the legitimate expectation that the treaties apply to Australian law. In his second reading speech argument for this bill, the Attorney-General refers to the claim that:
In passing this legislation, the parliament will also be reasserting its proper role in changing Australian law to implement treaties.
However, if the government is concerned that Australian parliaments should be the ones to legislate on human rights questions, it should support this bill, or introduce its own bill of rights. If the issue is one of Australian sovereignty on human rights issues, then let the government show goodwill by supporting a bill of rights in this centenary year.
One of the main arguments used by opponents of an Australian bill of rights is that the Constitution and the common law protect people's rights sufficiently. However, this is not true. Upon investigation, it is clear that there are very few rights listed in the Constitution. Thus, the Australian Constitution does not include anything amounting to freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex or race, and while the Constitution has been interpreted to protect freedom of political communication, it lacks a more general right of free speech. The Constitution does not contain an express guarantee of the right to vote, nor does it even mention the word `democracy'.
Some critics of a bill of rights actually believe that it undermines democracy. In a recent submission to the Standing Committee on Law and Justice inquiry into a NSW bill of rights, the NSW Premier Bob Carr claimed that a bill of rights would undermine the role of the parliament. However, Mr Carr's argument does not in any way allow for such a thing as the tyranny of the majority. The judgement of a parliament can often be oppressive against certain minority groups and individuals and, therefore, take rights away from the groups it is elected to protect.
One of the other main arguments against a bill of rights is that it is unnecessary. This is so far from the truth in Australia that one would have to be blind not to see the desperate need we have for such a bill. Former conservative Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser has highlighted this fact. Mr Fraser said recently:
Through much of my political life, I accepted the view of noted lawyers that our system of law, derived from Britain and the development of common law, best protected the human rights of individuals. I now believe that our own system has so patently failed to protect the `rights' of Aboriginals that we should look once again at the establishment of a bill of rights in Australia.
He now understands that the formal protection of every citizen's rights is of paramount importance, especially considering the slow pace of the process of reconciliation, the stolen generation, and the unacceptable treatment of asylum seekers.
Although formally, in Australia, we are all committed to a society based on equal rights and treatment, in practice, we have many cases of discrimination against people on the basis of race, ethnic background and religious preference. Article 11 of this bill is thus of crucial importance. It is headed `Rights of Minority Groups', and it states:
Persons who belong to an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority have the right, in community with other members of their own group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”
This clause is of crucial importance if the development of Australia as a multicultural society is to proceed, for there is no question that one of the greatest inhibitors of this development has been, and continues to be, direct and indirect discrimination against people because of their racial and cultural backgrounds.
I do not have time to refer to many of the other clauses in this bill, but I believe it is the responsibility of all those within society concerned with human rights to ensure that a parliamentary debate on a bill of rights occurs from a position of conscience rather than party lines and thereby to treat this need for an Australian bill of rights seriously. Let us receive the ideas of all parliamentarians on this matter. Let us also see what the views are of the government and the opposition on this very important bill or a similar bill in this year of Federation. I urge the parliament to support this bill and not miss this historic opportunity. I present the explanatory memorandum to this very important bill. (Time expired)
Bill read for the first time.
ANDREW’S ADDITIONAL NOTES FOR PRIVATE MEMBER’S BILL
AUSTRALIAN BILL OF RIGHTS BILL, 2001
Australia is one of the few Western nations that have not confirmed the protection of internationally-recognised rights for the individual through either legislative or constitutional means. This is despite the fact that nations that tend to set an example for Australia, such as the United States, Great Britain, and even New Zealand, have felt it necessary to develop and implement a Bill of Rights or Human Rights Act.
Malcolm Fraser has recently announced his own support for this notion - despite not supporting it when he was Prime Minister. Mr Fraser now feels the formal protection of every citizen's rights is of paramount importance, especially considering the slow pace of the process of reconciliation, the stolen generation, and the lacklustre treatment of asylum seekers.
It is often argued that the common law protects people's rights sufficiently. However, as can be seen in issues like that of the refugees and the Howard Government's lack of co-operation with United Nations Treaty Bodies, common law can not protect all citizens' rights to the degree that is required.
One can not thoroughly investigate the argument for a Bill of Rights before analysing experiences and current protected rights from a legal perspective. The Australian Constitution does serve to protect a small amount of Rights, as does both formal and delegated legislation. Australia has had several experiences attempting to codify these and further rights into one document. Where Australia has failed, other nations have succeeded. The following article looks at these examples and experiences and outlines the arguments for and against a Bill of Rights in Australia.
It is apparent from this list that the few rights that are listed in the Constitution are scattered about the text and are ad hoc rather than comprehensive. The result is that many basic rights receive no constitutional protection. For example, the text of the Australian Constitution does not include anything amounting to freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex or race, and while the Constitution has been interpreted to protect freedom of political communication, it lacks a more general right of free speech. The Constitution does not even contain an express guarantee of the right to vote.
The Scope for Further Legislation
Statutes such as the Racial Discrimination Act, the Sex Discrimination Act and the Disability Discrimination Act demonstrate the important role that the Federal Parliament has already played in the protection of human rights. However, these statutes go only a small way to meeting Australia's international obligations under treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. To date, the protection provided is ad hoc and of limited reach in focussing upon discrimination on the basis of race, sex or disability. There is, therefore, scope for the Parliament to enact a regime of rights protection under its power over 'external affairs' that would protect other basic rights such as the freedoms of speech, assembly and movement.
Arguments For
There are strong arguments for a Bill of Rights for Australia. The most significant arguments are set out below.
The main arguments for a Bill of Rights are that:
A Statutory Bill of Rights
The experience of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 demonstrates the potential effectiveness of a statutory Bill of Rights and the value, at least initially, of protecting rights using this means rather than by amendment of the Constitution. The United Kingdom's experience under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), which has many similarities to the New Zealand model, may also bear this out in the near future. As statutory Bills of Rights, being instruments that are not constitutionally entrenched, they can be repealed or altered by parliament. They, accordingly, do not amount to an irrevocable transfer of sovereign power from the legislature to the judiciary. Despite this limitation, the New Zealand instrument, in the hands of a cooperative judiciary, has made an important contribution to the protection of basic freedoms.
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act offers little on its face value in the way of rights protection. It is an ordinary, entrenched Act of the New Zealand Parliament. The Act recognises a number of rights, ranging from the freedoms of expression (section 14) and association (section 17) to the 'right not to be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation without that person's consent' (section 10). The protection afforded to such rights by the statute is limited. Section 2 states that: 'The rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights are affirmed', and section 3 that the Act applies to acts done by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches or by a person or body in the performance of a public function carried out under law. Under section 5, the listed rights 'may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society'. However, under section 4:
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after the commencement of this Bill of Rights), -
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective, or
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment -
By reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights.
At best, the statute allows the judiciary, under section 6, to interpret an enactment of the New Zealand Parliament to prefer 'a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights'. While the meaning of each of sections 4, 5 and 6 is clear, they produce a difficult and confusing interaction. For example, it is not easy to reconcile the protection afforded to the rights listed in the Act by section 5 with the limits placed by section 4 upon the power of a court to actually protect such rights. Despite the apparently limited protection granted by section 6 to the rights listed in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the judicial application has meant that the Act has played a prominent, and perhaps unexpected, role in fostering civil liberties. The former President of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, Sir Robin Cooke, in a moment of hyperbole, described section 6 as a 'key and strong section' that is 'a weapon of justice' for the judiciary. Generally, the Act has been 'regarded by judges as a fundamental constitutional document which must be given what has been called a purposive interpretation'.
Both past Australian and international experiences seem to recommend that the most pragmatic and potentially achievable means of bolstering rights protection in Australia would be by statutory means before constitutional means. This would also overcome the flaws in past referenda by allowing the oversight of the Federal Parliament at every step in continuing to build a culture of rights protection. This would maximise the chances of achieving a workable balance between enabling the judiciary to foster the rights of Australians and not vesting misplaced faith in the courts to solve Australia's pressing social, moral and political concerns.
The very concept of democracy involves the recognition of certain inalienable rights for all persons. The concept of rights has been embodied in all the substantial discussions of the meaning of modern democracy. It is, therefore, long overdue that these rights be incorporated in a Bill before this House. John Stuart Mill identified the essence of modern democracy as being intertwined with fundamental human rights. As he said in his book On Liberty:
“Society can and does execute its own mandates: And if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.”
In this eloquent passage, John Stuart Mill identified the absolute and crucial need for rights and the guarantee of rights in the constitution and laws of any country that is a genuine democracy. Mill went on to establish the now-famous principle of rights:
. . . That the sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
This International Covenant embodies within it the finest thinking in relation to the philosophy of human rights that has been developed in the recent history of mankind.
The 53 Articles of the Covenant embody such principles as the following: Article 6, the right to life; Article 7, freedom from torture and inhuman treatment; Article 8, freedom from slavery, servitude and forced labour; Article 9, the right to liberty and security of the person; Article 12, the right to freedom of movement; Article 13, the rights of aliens in respect of expulsion; Article 17, the right to privacy; Article 18, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; Article 19, the right to freedom of expression; Article 21, the right to peaceful assembly; Article 22, the right to freedom of association; and so on.
Some Opposition speakers have tried to imply that we do not need a Bill of Rights because, after all, all fundamental rights are incorporated in the Australian psyche, the Australian legal system and the Australian Constitution. The comment displays ignorance of both the constitutional provisions and the concrete facts. Consider, firstly, the constitutional provisions. Obviously, members opposite are clearly unaware of the severe inadequacies of the Australian Constitution as drawn up at the end of the last century. Unlike the American Constitution, the Australian Constitution does not refer to fundamental rights. More importantly, it does not refer to the concept of democracy. The word `democracy' does not appear in it. To suggest that we can rely on the protection of our rights based on conventional understandings is sheer nonsense.
The Liberal Party is also mistaken in its understanding of the concrete facts surrounding human rights in this country, for even in cases where there are formal and informal understandings of the protection of rights, those understandings are often not met. Although formally in Australia, we are all committed to a society based on equal rights and treatment, nevertheless, in practice, we have many cases of discrimination against people on the basis of race, ethnic background and religious preference. Article 5 of this Bill is thus of crucial importance. It is headed `Rights of Minority Groups', and it states:
Persons who belong to an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority have the right, in community with other members of their own group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.
This clause is of crucial importance if the development of Australia as a multicultural society is to proceed, for there is no question that one of the greatest inhibitors of this development has been and continues to be direct and indirect discrimination against people because of their racial and cultural backgrounds. If the Bill of Rights achieves no other purpose than to end this discrimination, it will have achieved a great deal.
The Bill of Rights will achieve much more than this, for it will also guarantee the fundamental political rights of participation in public life, peaceful assembly and freedom of association under Articles 6, 10 and 11. These freedoms are an indispensable element of democracy. They are necessary to keep a democracy honest to ensure that the will of the people can emerge through genuine, rational discussion, associations and peaceful meetings.
“Through much of my political life, I accepted the view of noted lawyers that our system of law, derived from Britain and the development of common law, best protected the human rights of individuals. I now believe that our own system has so patently failed to protect the “rights” of Aboriginals that we should look once again at the establishment of a Bill of Rights in Australia.”
- Malcolm Fraser
Mr Fraser noted that there remains extensive racial and ethnic conflict within Australia, and that is not free of discriminatory legislation and actions. This led to his declaration that we are now in urgent need of a Bill of Rights. Mr Fraser’s underlying reasoning for this view referred specifically to the way our common law system, together with legislation in place, has failed Australia’s indigenous population.He explained that he no longer accepted that Australia’s common law was good enough. It did not protect the rights of Aboriginals who were taken away from their families, nor did I help them with the mandatory detention issue. He believes that there are too many examples in which our Commonwealth system has simply not protected people. Such an Australian Bill of Rights would be broadly based on the need to guarantee basic rights to all individuals and minority groups.
He further commented on the role of the United Nations, with regard to the guarantee of basic rights to all individuals, and Australia’s recent reactionary treatment towards it. Mr Fraser referred to the fact that Australia had committed itself to this organisation, and that this commitment carried certain responsibilities. He indicated that Australia has supported a number of issues raised by the UN, for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. He asked whether we as a people really meant it when we took these steps, or were we trying to say, “We ratified these instruments so that we can apply them to the rest of the world, but they do not apply to Australia”?
Written at the end of 1997
I come to a consideration of the Cyprus issue with great sadness. I have already mentioned my background and my long association with this issue. I was born in Polis Chrysophou in Cyprus to Greek parents: my father was from Cyprus, and my mother was from the Greek Island of Chios. My father himself had knowledge of the Turkish community and culture; in fact, my father used to speak perfect Turkish. I believe that, on a number of occasions, both sides in Cyprus have come very close to a solution but unfortunately have not succeeded. I believe that this has been a very bad thing for the Cypriot people, both Turkish and Greek.
The perspective that I am coming from is the fact that in my own electorate in Melbourne, Australia, both Turkish and Greek people have been able to work together under the umbrella of a multicultural society to develop an appreciation of each other's cultures and understand that, as minority groups in that society, they have many things in common and that they need to work together to secure their full rights in that society.
To understand the current impasse in Cyprus, one must recognise the fact that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have radically different perspectives on events and the causes of the crisis. I begin by considering these now.
The Greek Cypriot Viewpoint
From the time of the transfer of power in 1878 from Turkey to Britain, a nationalist movement arose in Cyprus against British rule. Originally, this movement was directed towards ENOSIS – the union of Cyprus with Greece. The Turkish Cypriots naturally resisted the movement, and after many problems, a compromise was found. Thus, in 1960, Cyprus was declared an independent Republic on the basis of the Zurich-London agreements.
However, according to the Greek Cypriot view, “the constitution that was imposed on the Cypriot people contained divisive provisions which encouraged confrontation and dissent between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots (80% and 18% of the population respectively). In addition, the rights granted to Britain, Greece and Turkey embroiled the young state in the antagonisms among the great powers and in the clashes between various economic and strategic interests in the region”.
Whereas the Turkish Cypriots maintain that they have been oppressed under the new constitution, the Greek Cypriot view is that extremists encouraged by Turkey were behind all of the problems that arose during that period. “Turkey, with a view to promoting her expansionist and partitionist plans, found ways to mobilise Turkish Cypriot extremists to prevent the smooth functioning of the state, which led to the intercommunal clashes of 1963/64 and 1967”.
According to the Greek Cypriot view, these troubles merely gave Turkey an excuse to achieve its expansionist plans of seeking to extend its empire into Cyprus: the opportunity arose in 1974 when Turkish forces invaded and occupied the northern part of Cyprus. “The coup against the legal Cyprus government on 15 July 1974, which was organised by the military junta ruling Greece at the time, gave Turkey the much longed-for excuse to invade the Republic of Cyprus, which it did on 20 July 1974 in contravention of the UN Charter and all principles governing international relations”.
The consequences of this occupation are highly resented by the Greek Cypriots. They assert the following “results of the Turkish invasion and occupation”:
“30% of the Territory of the Republic of Cyprus – i.e. the northern part of the island, where 70% of the natural resources are concentrated – is under Turkish occupation.
200,000 Greek Cypriots – one-third of the population, have been displaced from the occupied northern sector, where they had constituted 80% of the inhabitants. At the same time, the Turkish Cypriots who lived in the free areas were forced by their leaders to move to the occupied area.
35 000 Turkish soldiers, armed with the latest weapons and supported by land and sea, are stationed in the occupied area, making it, according to the UN Secretary-General, one of the most militarised regions of the world.
85,000 Turks have been brought over from Turkey to colonise the occupied area with the aim of changing the demography of the island and controlling the political situation.
In an effort to consolidate the de facto situation, the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” was unilaterally declared in 1983 in the occupied area, a pseudo-state recognised only by Turkey and entirely dependent on it, which was condemned right away by the Security Council in its resolution 541 of 1983.
According to Turkish-Cypriot newspapers, about 50,000 Turkish Cypriots emigrated from the occupied area between 1974 and 1995 because of the economic, social and moral deprivation that prevails there. As a result, the Turkish Cypriots who are left are today out numbered by the Turkish troops together with the colonists.
The illegal regime in the occupied area is deliberately and methodically trying to eradicate every trace of a 9,000-year-old cultural and historical heritage. All Greek toponyms have been replaced by Turkish ones. Churches, monuments, cemeteries and archaeological sites have been destroyed, desecrated or looted.
This approach to the substantive issues is also reflected in the question of blame for the failure of talks; thus, when addressing the General Assembly, President Clerides reported; “that no progress has been made towards the solution of the Cyprus problem due to the inflexibility of the Turkish side”.
Clerides was referring to the invitation from UN Secretary-General Mr Kofi Annan in June 1997 to attend face-to-face talks with the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community in Troutbeck, and later in Glion. Clerides states: “we responded positively and demonstrated our sincere and unwavering commitment to the peace process as the only means of solving the Cyprus question and our will to work for a comprehensive, just and viable solution. During the talks, we worked hard and co-operated constructively with Mr Cordovez, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser, with the sole aim of breaking the impasse and moving forward to reverse the status quo created and maintained by Turkey since 1974 by the use of force and declared unacceptable by numerous Security Council Resolutions. In contrast, the response of the other side was completely negative”.
What happened was that Mr Denktash refused to hold any discussions on the substance of the Cyprus issue unless the European Union froze its plans for accession talks with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. Indeed, Mr Denktash stated that, if the European Union decided to proceed with Cyprus’ application, he would stop all negotiations in the future between the two communities – a threat which he subsequently carried out.
The Greek Cypriot leadership is therefore united in its assessment of the reasons for the breakdown of the 1997 talks:
“Any doubts as to the real cause of the failure of the talks to produce results on the substantive aspects of the Cyprus problem were dissolved by the unanimous verdict of the international community pronounced on August 20 by the President of the Security Council in a statement to the press, after the briefing by Mr Cordovez on the outcome of the talks in Glion.
In the statement, our positive attitude and co-operation were commended, whereas the Turkish Cypriot side was blamed for impeding substantive progress by the attempt to bring in preconditions to the table. The same verdict was reached by the European Union, which also rejected any link between the talks and the start of the European Union’s accession negotiations with Cyprus”.
To support his claim as to the blame for the deadlock, Mr Clerides quotes from the Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations to the Security Council, 19th November 1992, document S/24830.
Para. 45 “However, some of the positions voiced by the Turkish Cypriot side are, in a fundamental way, outside the framework of the “Set of Ideas”.
Para. 47 “I have found that the position of the Turkish Cypriot side is fundamentally at variance with the “Set of Ideas” under three broad headings: (a) the concept of the federation; (b) displaced persons; and (c) territorial adjustments.”
He also quotes from the Report of the Secretary-General of the 30th May 1994, documents S/1994/629:
Para. 53 “For the present, the Security Council finds itself faced with an already familiar scenario: the absence of agreement due essentially to a lack of political will on the Turkish Cypriot side…”
During the talks in Glion, Mr Clerides proposed a further initiative to Mr Denktash that both leaders should make a declaration denouncing the use of force as a means of solving the Cyprus problem, to agree to work for a specific program of reduction of military forces and equipment and a program of demilitarisation of the island and limitation of importation of arms. Not unexpectedly, this proposal was not accepted by Mr Denktash, who sees the presence of the Turkish armed forces as indispensable to the security of the Turkish Cypriots.
The negative results from these initiatives have led the Greek Cypriots to condemn the “intransigence” of the Turkish side: “The result of this deliberate inflexibility is the perpetuation of the illegal Turkish occupation of 37% of the territory of the Republic by Turkish military forces, the artificial forceful separation of the two communities, the colonisation of the occupied area by illegal settlers from Turkey, the refugee problem, the usurpation of the Greek Cypriot properties in the occupied area and the continuous blunt violation by the Turkish side of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions”.
The Greek Cypriot side also has considerable bitterness towards Turkey for its continuing involvement in the Cyprus crisis – which it sees as a frustrating solution. The Cyprus Government's official position states:
“The Cyprus problem is not an intercommunal dispute. It is a question of invitation and continuing occupation. Turkey continues, unpunished, to show contempt for the calls of the international community, as expressed in dozens of UN resolutions, and continues to maintain the occupation of the artificial division of the island. It has not shown, so far, the slightest inclination that it possesses the necessary political will to solve the problem”.
The Greek Cypriots believe that they have made many positive concessions towards the resolution of the crisis. Thus, President Clerides said to the United Nations:
“Let me assure, once again, this august body of the commitment of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to continue to work with the Secretary-General in his efforts to find a solution based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded and comprising two politically equal communities, as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession”.
The Turkish Cypriot Viewpoint
From various contacts I have had with Turkish Cypriots, including some key leaders and a reading of the literature, their position and that of Mr Denktash can be outlined as follows.
According to Mr Denktash, it is clear that there is great hostility towards him and his people; there is no attempt to acknowledge or recognise him and his people. He sees this as a repeat of the kind of treatment that had been received by the Turkish Cypriot people between 1963 and 1974. According to him, during that time, they had suffered dramatically and there had been an attempt to reverse the intention, meaning and essence of the Constitution of 1960. Denktash's view is that the attempted amendments to the Constitution by President Makarios had been the source of the breakdown of the situation. From that time, there had been an attempt to reduce the status of the Turkish Cypriot people to simply a minority, with only minority rights in Cyprus. He represents this as a totally unacceptable situation and completely contrary to the determinations of the 1960 Accords and, indeed, the later agreements with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
In a recent paper from the Turkish Government, the Turkish Cypriot view of the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus is presented thus:
“The Greek Cypriots and Greece, however, regarded the establishment of the partnership Republic as a temporary set-back to their ultimate aim of uniting the island with Greece, i.e. Enosis attempted to destroy both the internal and the external balances created by the 1960 state of affairs from the very first day they were established. The Greek Cypriot co-founder partner of the 1960 Republic resorted to violence in December 1963 and, by expelling the Turkish Cypriot partner from all the government organs by force of arms, usurped the state machinery. The Turkish Cypriot people refused to bow to this illegality, and years of unprecedented cruelty, bloodshed and suffering started for the Turkish Cypriot people who protected their vested rights, culture and identity at great cost to life and property.
Denktash constantly writes about his difficulty in trusting the Greek Cypriots and why, according to him, none of the Greek Cypriot leaders, especially the current President Clerides, are really interested in a solution. He refers to “opportunities” that had taken place in the past, when he had been prepared to go forward with a solution and when it had been rejected, especially in 1977 with Makarios and in 1987 with Kyprianou. He also claims the 1992 “Set of Ideas” presented by the Secretary-General was undermined by the Greek side.
On these issues, the Turkish Government paper claims:
“The fundamental basis of the search for a just and lasting solution in Cyprus, which was initiated in 1968, has been the equal partnership of the two peoples on the island and the maintenance of the balance established between the two motherlands, namely Turkey and Greece. In the course of the efforts conducted under the auspices of successive UN Secretaries-General towards realising this objective, a number of basic parameters emerged, such as bi-zonality, political and sovereign equality and the continuation of the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance.
The repeated warnings of the Turkish Cypriot side aside, the course which the Greek Cypriot side has followed, namely its rejection of the 1985-86 Draft Framework Agreement, the UN-sponsored “Set of Ideas” of 1992 as well as the package of Confidence Building Measures of 1994 and many others, should have demonstrated to all concerned that the other side is not interested in a negotiated settlement but is out to destroy the very parameters which have been established through the process of negotiations”.
According to Denktash, these earlier setbacks are nothing compared to the current state of affairs: he now claims that the whole process of achieving reconciliation through the intercommunal talks has completely and utterly broken down following the unilateral push by the Clerides Government to enter the European Union as “Cyprus”, without any acknowledgement of recognition of either his administration or indeed of the Turkish Cypriot people. This, according to him, was a completely disastrous move that has been the source of much tension and has broken down negotiations.
The Turkish Government paper reflects the view of the Denktash administration when it says on this matter:
“With its unilateral and unlawful application for EU membership in 1990, the Greek Cypriot side added a new and crucial dimension to its efforts to frustrate the negotiating process and do away with the parameters which had been so meticulously worked out over the years. The Greek Cypriot side never concealed that it was only using EU membership as a ploy for doing away with the vested rights of the Turkish Cypriot people and for destroying the balance between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus in favour of Greece.
The unilateral and unlawful application of the Greek Cypriot regime for EU membership is void ab initio and cannot be binding on the Turkish Cypriot people or on Cyprus as a whole. The Greek Cypriot administration has no lawful authority under the 1960 Treaties or at all to make such an application on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot people or the whole of Cyprus.
Consequently, the EU should not have processed it as if it were a valid application.
The Zurich and London Agreements, which had established the bi-communal 1960 Republic of Cyprus on the basis of absolute equal partnership, prohibit the membership of the Republic in international organisations and pacts of alliance in which both Turkey and Greece are not members.
Indeed, from Denktash's point of view, this acceptance of the application by the European Union has cut out his people and himself from the process. The European Union itself has treated his people and himself with contempt.
It is, therefore, no surprise that the Denktash administration has taken the view that it will no longer participate in UN-sponsored talks between the two communities. In so doing, it is insisting that these talks have failed and that it will not work towards a federated state solution until the Denktash administration is first recognised as a separate state.
“It is obvious that as long as the Greek Cypriot side is unjustly treated as the government of the whole island, it will not adopt a more flexible, realistic approach to the Cyprus issue. On the other hand, the decades-old approach adopted by the international community of having negotiations at the level of “the two communities”, in the belief that the question of equal status would come about as the outcome, has failed to produce any result as the Greek Cypriot leadership, encouraged by the diplomatic and economic benefits of political recognition, has lacked the need and the incentive to share power with the Turkish Cypriot side on the basis of political equality. And now, with its decision taken at the Luxembourg Summit held on 12-13 December 1997, the EU has not only created further impediments in the way of a political solution but also destroyed both the parameters and the established framework of the UN negotiating process.
It has, therefore, become imperative that a new approach and parameters that reflect the existing realities on the island are determined in order to open the way for reconciliation. The fact that there are two distinct peoples and two separate independent states in Cyprus is an indisputable reality. It is for this reason that any future phase of negotiations should take place not, as hitherto, between the “two communities” but between the two sovereign states in Cyprus.
This extremely tough new condition, seeking recognition of the Denktash administration as a separate state, is clearly contrary to all the previous decisions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus. Mr Denktash and the Government of Turkey know that it is extremely unlikely that it will be agreed to.
The situation has become even more negative because of the conflict between the Greek and Turkish sides over the question of the proposed deployment by the Cyprus Government of the S-300 missiles, which it is purchasing from Russia. Both Turkey and the Denktash administration are furious at this move by Mr Clerides; they see it as a military provocation and one that will further destabilise the situation in Cyprus. Some Turkish commentators even see this proposed deployment as a threat to Turkey itself. On the other hand, the Greek side sees the deployment of the S-300 missiles as a purely defensive measure aimed at protecting the island from potential attacks by Turkish aircraft. The Government of Cyprus insists that as an independent republic, Cyprus is entitled under UN rules to take reasonable measures to defend itself. Clearly, the disagreements on this issue are fundamental.
Does all the above mean that there is now no hope for a resolution of the Cyprus issue? This is indeed the view of one observer, Michael Eliezer, a former Israeli Ambassador. He states:
“A unitary state proved impossible; a federation could not be attained within the confines of the island. The broader context might be recognised by all as preferable to the separate, unwanted and embittered independence of a Cypriot Republic incapable of attaining peaceful relations with its Turkish compatriots and with Turkey”.
“With the active support of the international community, the basic vital aspirations of all parties can be satisfied: a reunion with Greece for the Greeks of Cyprus, and a similar association of the Turkish Cypriots with Turkey”.
Can A Solution be found for Cyprus?
In my opinion, this proposal from Mr Eliezer plays into the hands of those ethnic chauvinists from both sides, who do not want to achieve a united Cyprus and who do not want to see the Cypriot people living together. These are people who, in my opinion, are stuck in the ethnic conflicts of the past. They are people who do not look to the future, the 21st Century, which will be a century when the world will become much more cosmopolitan and multicultural, where borders will be crossed, where people will have access from all over the world (no matter where they live) to the ideas and cultural traditions of many other people.
That a positive resolution is possible was shown by Mr Denktash himself when he said in 1996 to Mr Clerides that both sides had come close to accepting the UN Secretary General's ideas. Indeed, on a number of occasions, both sides have accepted in principle the idea of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation under one central government. I am very concerned that in the last twelve months, we have moved so far away from that proposal to the point that we are now facing a more serious crisis.
From my in-depth discussions and observations on this issue, I am of the view that the majority of people of Cyprus (both Greek and Turkish) genuinely want to live together in a situation of a united society, based on harmony and respect. However, for this to be possible, we must achieve the constitutional and structural framework that permits that possibility.
Furthermore, I believe that the modern world, it is increasingly necessary for Greek and Turkish peoples to gain a much greater appreciation of each other’s cultures and to support one another. In my view, this can be done through a solution in Cyprus. Why do I say that? First, Cyprus used to be a model of cooperation and contact between the Greek and Turkish cultures. It was an example to the world of a multi-ethnic society; it can be restored. Secondly, given the reality of the European Union and the application of Cyprus to join the Union, the Turkish Cypriots become a critical factor in the entry of Turkey. In a sense, the Turkish Cypriots are the catalysts that can open the door to Turkey. But depending on what happens, actions by the Denktash administration can also close the door to Turkey. That matter is in their hands and the hands of the Government of Turkey.
Of course, changes and concessions can be made, and should be made, by the Greek Cypriot side as well. In particular, I believe that Greek Cypriots should provide substantial support for the entry of Turkey into the European Union within the context of the resolution of the Cyprus issue. During my visit to Cyprus in April, I said to the media on this question; “ Turkey has been kicked around quite a bit by the European Union regarding its membership application. I think it is clear that eventually Turkey will have to participate in Europe, and people of goodwill ought to support Turkey’s participation under the appropriate conditions”.
Ultimately, the resolution of the crisis has to involve the acceptance of the idea of a united Federated Cyprus by all sides. Once that principle and idea is accepted, I believe the other problems can be tackled. The question is whether there is sufficient political will on all sides to accept that idea and to develop a process to get to that point. Unfortunately, that political will seems to have been lost in recent months.
The Need for a Federated Cyprus
In Cyprus, progress can only be made once the two ethnic groups commit themselves to a Federal State. This was the gist of the UN Secretary General’s “Set of Ideas” framework. Indeed, Mr Denktash was involved in the negotiation of this framework and said that he accepted 91% of the proposals. However, recently, the Turkish Cypriot administration appears to have forgotten the importance of what they achieved in this “Set of Ideas”. When we think of it in international terms, of all the bi-communal federations that have been proposed around the world, the concessions that the Turkish Cypriots managed to achieve from the Greek side, and from the Secretary-General were tremendous. Clearly, when you compare them with other federations and other situations around the world, they are the most generous. There are very few federations where the proportion of the population is around 20% and where they have achieved a 50/50 basis in the Upper House of Parliament, which has control of legislation. There are very few cases where you have a Vice President who has the veto power of legislation. There are very few cases where you have guarantees in the Constitution in terms of the proportion of the different peoples in the key parts of the Government. For example, even the Constitution of modern South Africa gives no such guarantees to the ‘white’ community; they have some guarantees, but nothing like the guarantees that the Turkish Cypriots have managed to achieve in the “Set of Ideas”. The same is true of the Catholics in Northern Ireland, who are proportionally larger in numbers than the Turkish Cypriots.
What is sad about Cyprus is that we now have a situation where the chauvinists on both sides, whether they be Greek or Turkish - those who do not want a solution and those who are against the idea of federation - are winning. Leaving aside the question of blame for this state of affairs, the sad fact is that his huge breakthrough in the “Set of Ideas” is in danger of being lost. In this context, it is, to say the least, extremely unfortunate that Mr Denktash has recently moved away from his own proposal of the 20 January 1995, in which he expressed the desire to begin substantive talks on the bi-communal and bi-zonal federal state, based on the “Set of Ideas”. At that time, he said:
"We believe that the two peoples of Cyprus who share the same homeland inevitably also share the same political and economic destiny. The arrangements of 1960 were the products of this reality. This being the case, the EU membership of Cyprus can only be based on the mutual wish and will of the two communities. In view of the above, the Turkish Cypriot side wishes to announce, here and now, that it is prepared to discuss the subject of EU membership of the Federal Republic within the framework foreseen in the "Set of Ideas" as soon as an agreement is reached on a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal solution and the equal political status of both communities is respected.
I believe that what is required now is, firstly, the development of a plan directed towards overcoming the principal issues in contention. Such a plan would require that both sides make a firm commitment to move towards a Federated Republic of Cyprus. On the basis of that firm commitment, a number of mechanisms and action programs (which would then deal with the key outstanding issues, such as the S300 missile issue and the issue of the EU application) could be put into place. Rather than returning to interminable discussions, such a plan would incorporate the concessions that have been made in the “Set of Ideas” and in the earlier discussions.
The Need for Goodwill amongst Ethnic Leaders in Cyprus
The crisis in Cyprus can only continue on a positive path if there is goodwill between the leaders of the two ethnic groups in the society. Such goodwill, however, needs to be based on the real possibility of good relations existing between the Greek and Turkish people. This was the message that I sought to take to Cyprus in my recent visit in April. During that visit, I had several meetings with Gustav Feissel who until recently was the representative of the Secretary General of the UN in Cyprus and who was for years involved in trying to resolve the crisis. In my first meeting with Mr Feissel, I stressed the fact that Australia provided a good example of how the two communities can live together; Greek and Turkish Australians have built strong links in Australia. I explained to Feissel how we were able in Australia to bring Greek and Turkish people to cooperate and work together, and how this was a good example of what could be done in Cyprus itself.
After the meeting, Feissel said to the television and other media that he thought that the example that we had set in Australia, was an excellent one. He noted that my constituency consists of both Greeks and Turks and pointed out that “he has been elected by both, which shows he must have a magic touch. I am trying to find out what that is”. This was reported in The Cyprus Weekly on 17/4/98 under the heading, ‘Greek, Turkish Australians call for change of climate’. It stated that I had “conveyed a message from Greeks and Turks living in Australia for a change in the current negative climate concerning the Cyprus problem”.
However, while I believe that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot people have an earnest desire for a settlement, the translation of this into goodwill by the political leadership is another matter.
Interview With Dr Andrew Theophanous – Croatia’s Independence 25 Years On
June 24, 2016
An interview by Ina Vukic with Dr Andrew Theophanous, a former member of Australian parliament for 21 years, whose ardent support for the international recognition of Croatian independence was of key importance during the early 1990’s. In 1996 Croatia’s president Dr Franjo Tudjman awarded Dr Theophanous with a Medal of Honor – the Order of the Croatian Interlace, an award bestowed upon foreign and domestic nationals for their distinguished contribution to the development and reputation of the Republic of Croatia and the welfare of her citizens.
INA This year, 2016, will mark 25 years since Croatia declared on 25 June 1991 independence from former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and in the eyes of Australian Croatians you stood as one of Australian heroes and champions that supported Croatia’s plight for secession from communist Yugoslavia. Could you tell us what were some of your main political and moral beliefs that led you to actively support and lobby for independence of Croatia as a Member of Australian Parliament at the time?
ANDREW :In my federal electorate of Calwell, there were many Croatian people. In the years before 1991, I became quite close to the Croatian community and recognized their concern for an independent country – given their cultural differences with the other states of former Yugoslavia. At that time, Croatian identity was not approved of in Australia; notwithstanding this, I supported funding for Croatian programs. I came under criticism because there had been a smear over the very idea of Croatian identity. I have always been a supporter of freedom and the right of different cultural groups to have significant and meaningful levels of self-determination.
Naturally enough as events unfolded in former Yugoslavia, it became clear that the movement for Croatian independence needed support within parliamentary circles. So together with several colleagues in both the Labor party and the Liberal party, we formed the Parliamentary Group in order to support this claim for independence. WE did this while, at the same time, sticking within the rules of parliamentary procedure. We were prepared to undertake various activities to promote this cause and we certainly did. I must say though that, when we began this, I never realized the enormity of the task facing us, the problems we would encounter and the exciting events that would follow.
INA: In August 1991 you were a member of a group of Members of Australian Parliament who formed the “Federal Parliamentarians For Croatia and Slovenia” Friendship Group. While your book “Understanding Multiculturalism and Australian Identity”, first published in 1995 by Elikia Books, speaks of pathways to Australia recognizing Croatia and Slovenia as independent states could you summarise the circumstances and central aims for the formation of this group within the Australian Parliament?
ANDREW : Actually I was the founding Chairman of the Parliamentary Group for Croatia and Slovenia. In 1991, events in former Yugoslavia were becoming very dramatic. The Croatian community had approached me about the importance of doing something to promote the cause of Croatian independence within parliament. Together with the secretary of the Group, Mr Paul Filing (who was a Liberal MP), we decided around that time to form the Group and we encouraged MPs and Senators to join and a significant number did so.
However there also was a lot of reticence by many MPs because of the smears that had been made for years against the Croatian community. As Chairman of the Group, I myself came under very heavy criticism from some MPs who were ferociously opposed to the idea of Croatian independence. Nevertheless we persisted and we began making representations, collecting information and building links with the Croatian community.
It was because of my position as Chairman of the Group and the impact we were having in parliament that there followed a dramatic series of events. This began in June 1991, when Croatian community leaders Antun Babic and Tom Bosnjak came to my electoral office in Melbourne and presented me with an official letter from President Tudjman inviting me to visit Croatia to see the situation for myself and to express support for the Croatian people. This was at the time when Croatia was being bombed by the Yugoslav forces and the situation was quite dangerous. Nevertheless I undertook that trip and I was the first MP from the West to make such a visit. I had important meetings with President Tudjman and other key members of the Croatian Government. Many other dramatic events occurred after that.
I remained as Chairman of the Parliamentary Group until March 1993 when I became Parliamentary Secretary to Prime Minister Paul Keating and therefore member of the executive government – when I was no longer eligible to hold the post. However, as you are aware, I continued as a very active member of the Group for many years after that – Indeed until I left parliament in 2001.
INA:In your book “Understanding Multiculturalism and Australian Identity”, you refer to the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and the lobby of the Croatian community in Australia and how as war-related events unraveled there the “Australian foreign policy was increasingly directed towards giving greater priority to events in that region.” How did you personally, as Member of the Australian Parliament experience any lobbying that may have come your way at the time from the Australian Croatian community?
ANDREW: As I have indicated, my personal experience in relation to the submissions and lobbying of the Australian Croatian community resulted in a dramatic series of events – beginning with my visit to Croatia during the war in June 1991. I remember very clearly that night when we entered Zagreb ; the whole city was completely dark and all you could hear was distant bombing from the Yugoslav forces. It was a very eerie situation. Notwithstanding the dangerous circumstances, I was very warmly received by President Tudjman and several key officials including Dr Zdravko Tomac Deputy Premier of Croatia, Mr Stipe Mesic, Dr Zarko Domijan, President of the Parliament of Croatia, and Dr Zvonimir Separovic, Foreign Minister of Croatia.
There were a number of important meetings in which I was briefed on the situation. It was emphasised by all these leaders that the recognition of Croatia as an independent country by other countries was the most urgent matter. I undertook to do whatever I could to support this. During my short stay, I visited several places, which had been destroyed by the bombing of Zagreb, and I spoke many times in support of the Croatian people on the television news. I made some notes of the various meetings; the most important such note related to my meeting with President Tudjman. I now wish to quote from part of my note on that dramatic meeting:
“Dr Tudjman said that he was very disappointed by the response of the world community to the cries of Croatia for independence and self-determination. The cries of independence for other Republics, such as the Baltic States, had been recognised. A referendum had been made by the people of Croatia and over 90 percent of the people had expressed their desire to be a separate state.
Notwithstanding all of that, he had proceeded cautiously -preferring to discuss the issues over and over, rather than to move hastily and to be provocative. Unfortunately, all that these delays and his response had done, according to the President, was to give time for the Serbian held armed forces to move effectively in their attempts to seize territory and create the Greater Serbia.
Dr Tudjman was very disappointed with the failure of the Europeans to come to a coherent view and to move to either achieve some kind of peacekeeping force or to recognise the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, and thereby give them the chance to defend themselves from what he perceived to be the outside attack of the Yugoslav armed forces.
The President enumerated many of the recent incidents – which other people I had spoken to had also enumerated. In particular, he had serious concerns about the attempts to take the war to civilian population, through shelling of villages.
Dr Tudjman also reiterated that Croatia was ready – as part of the package for its recognition – to give full commitment by legislative, constitutional and in terms of the administration, to the protection of the human rights of the Serbian minority. He denied the claims that had been put about by President Milosevic of Serbia that the Serbians had been attacked or provoked in any way in the current crisis”.
Further developments took place in Croatia in the next 18 months. During that time, I visited Croatia on two more occasions and had the honour of meeting President Tudjman again on those occasions. I reported all these meetings to the Australian Government and to major rallies of Croatian people in Melbourne, Sydney, Canberra and other places in Australia. These rallies were very important because in this way , we brought increasing pressure for the recognition of Croatia.
INA:Australia was one of the first non-European countries to recognise Croatia as a sovereign and independent state on 16 January 1992, and indeed, I recall your announcement of the fact at a gala function held by the Croatian community at the Regent Hotel Sydney the same evening. Could you please share with us any conversation you may have had with the Australian Prime Minister on that day?
ANDREW: Prime Minister Keating rang me at 5 am in that morning; the decision had been taken very late in the night by the Cabinet. I was probably the first person outside of the Cabinet in Australia to know what had happened . Prime Minister Keating knew of, and respected, my interest and dedication to this cause. He wanted me to be able to convey this news to the Croatian community. I immediately rang the President of the Croatian Federation and several other major Croatian community leaders to tell of the news.
I was very happy to be able to announce the news at the function. This was a remarkable achievement of the Croatian community and the Parliamentary Group. It should be remembered that there was considerable opposition within parliament to this step taken by the Keating government. This is because there was still the idea in the foreign ministries of Australia and of the United States that they should still attempt to keep Yugoslavia together – rather than to recognize the march of history and the necessity for the Croatian people to have their independence. As it was the Parliamentary Group and the Croatian community in Australia were extremely happy. We certainly celebrated that night in Sydney.
INA: Croatian immigrants have settled well, contributed notably to and assimilated into the Australian multicultural life, how valuable for this assimilation to occur do you think Australian government’s multicultural policy has been?
ANDREW : There is no doubt the Australian Multicultural policy has played a major role in the integration of the Croatian community into Australian society. As you are aware, I played a very active role in promoting the correct understanding of the philosophy and practice – especially through the book that you have referred to in your earlier questions. This book was officially launched by Prime Minister Keating in December 1995. I believe the Croatian community has been a very good example of how multiculturalism should proceed in this nation. The key features of multicultural philosophy are present in their approach. On the one hand, we need to respect the foundations of Australian society – including our laws and our democratic processes. On the other hand, we also need to provide the facility for people of different cultural backgrounds to express and retain their cultural traditions. The generation of Croatian Australians who fought for independence also put into place many programs and activities to retain the presence of Croatian culture within the Australian multicultural society. It is now important for the younger generation to continue this work and this tradition.
INA:At the time of the conflict in Croatia, as Member of Parliament for Calwell, you were also a member of the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Migration and you instigated some initiatives at the time in the humanitarian field for refugees and displaced persons who, in their hundreds of thousands, found themselves in Croatia in dire needs for assistance. Could you describe some of the work or initiatives brought by that Committee in early 1990’s?
ANDREW: Actually during those years of the conflict, I was also Chairman of the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Migration. That Committee, together with the Labor Party’s own Committee on Immigration (which I also headed), brought in several key initiatives. One of these was to implement a special humanitarian program for refugees coming from the conflict of the nations of former Yugoslavia.
The majority of people who took advantage of this program were Croatians and Bosnians – although there were also some Serbian people escaping from the Milosevic regime. This was a very significant program because it created a precedent. It was part of my philosophy that there should be special programs of this kind to deal with emergencies and special circumstances when large numbers of refugees were created in a specific part of the world. There have been very few such programs in Australian migration history. Unfortunately in the last 20 years or so there have hardly been any – even though the refugee problems have dramatically increased.
It was wonderful to see Croatian people arriving and telling us their stories: people who had been traumatised by the war, especially Croatian community members who had been living in Bosnia where the conflict became much more bloody and extended over a much longer period than did the battle for Croatian independence. I am pleased to say that those people who came under this program have participated well in the Australian community and made a significant contribution.
INA: You had been a Member of Australian Parliament for over 21 years to 2001. Having in mind the personal commitment to freedom and democracy that you demonstrated in the case for Croatia’s independence during 1990’s what do you believe that a country which has transitioned out of the communist regime as Croatia has, should in its political ideology, which in turn influences public administration and consumer rights, have achieved by the end of its first quarter of century in democracy and independence?
ANDREW :The first and most important achievement in these first 25 years is the establishment in Croatia of the general idea of democracy, including the principles of human rights and the constitutional structures of democracy. Croatia has managed to achieve this in a reasonable way. Obviously there are difficulties at the moment because the current government is based primarily on a coalition of political parties. However this point should not be overstated; indeed this seems inevitable in the light of the European tradition to have a multitude of parties.
However it is important that the situation not get out of control, so as to make the achievement of stable government too difficult.
A second major achievement has been the entry of Croatia into the European union. It was a great feat that Croatia managed this in such a short period of time. However Croatia needs to be very careful not to enter into the EURO system – at least not until major reforms are made to that system.
There are many major challenges facing Croatia in the future; I consider two of these to be major issues. Firstly, there is the need for the modernization of the economy – to introduce a higher level of technology, especially in the areas of industry, infrastructure and IT. Education needs to be upgraded with a focus on these technologies and the skills required to achieve these goals. Only in this way can the challenges of the 21st century be met. It is also important for Croatia to encourage investment in a whole series of industries, especially in manufacturing and in IT development. As I have already indicated, this requires the participation of the Croatian Diaspora to bring their knowledge and skills gained overseas for the service of the Croatian nation; they also need to assist in bringing more financial investment into Croatia. That the economy can pick up and modernize is already illustrated by the significant and substantial success of the Croatian tourist industry.
Secondly, there is a need for reform of the public service in Croatia. From the era of the early days of the Yugoslavian regime, Croatian society unfortunately adopted some archaic practices in relation to the operations of the public service. There is thus a substantial need to overcome the excessive bureaucracy in the public service and this will require significant reforms.
My comments here are intended to be positive suggestions in relation to achieving a bright future for Croatia. I believe that it is possible to build on the fundamental strength of the Croatian nation; this strength is reinforced because of the spirit and determination of the Croatian people themselves – who are aiming to make the new nation great. I believe that they will succeed.
Dr Andrew Theophanous
February 1993 speaks at
the celebration of the opening
of Croatian Diplomatic and Consular Missions
In Australia
INA:What was your opinion of Dr Franjo Tudjman as a statesman and leader when it comes to achieving independence from a totalitarian communist regime as Yugoslavia was? What were the moments you remember best spent in Dr Franjo Tudjman’s company?
ANDREW : In all I had four meetings with President Tudjman – three in Croatia and one when he came to Australia for an official visit. I remember well that occasion, especially the enormous reception he received from thousands of Croatians in a huge stadium in Melbourne. I was also very honored by the reception the Croatian community gave to me on that occasion.
There is no doubt President Tudjman was one of the great leaders of the twentieth century. He showed courage and wisdom in the way he dealt with so many issues during that time of crisis. The following observations from my notes on the first meeting in June 1991 indicated to me that, while strongly backing Croatian independence, he was also a man who believed in peace and justice:
“I indicated to President Tudjman our concern, and the concern of the very large number of people of Croatian background in Australia, as to what was happening. I explained that it was the Australian Government’s intention to try to see an amicable resolution of the crisis and, as soon as possible, an end to the fighting. He was aware of the initiative of our government in taking the matter to the United Nations and he thanked Australia for that – and in particular for the efforts of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister.
He was keen to see the matter achieve greater international prominence because he believed that much of what was happening was not really understood by the outside world. In this context, the President said that he was happy that the matter had gone to the United Nations. He was happy to give assurances to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to anyone else at the United Nations with respect to the Serbian minority. Finally he appealed to Australia to assist by recognising Croatia.”
Finally there was one event which has remained with me as a lasting memory. In the middle of this one hour discussion at th Presidential palace on that June day , the SIRENS began all over the city of Zagreb warning of a Yugoslav air strike. President Tudjman said to me that all his staff and myself would have to go down into the underground shelter below the Presidential building. I said, “Mr President, surely you are coming as well”. He said “ I am not going to allow this dictatorship in Belgrade to intimidate me. I am the President and I will stay in my presidential suite”. So we both stayed there and continued our discussions while the sires roared. This to me spoke volumes about the measure of the man.
INA:You visited Croatia during 1990’s, what were some of the impressions you took away with you after leaving it?
ANDREW : I have already spoken of my impressions in 1991 during the struggle for independence. I also visited in December 1991 and in 1992. In 1996, President Tudjman presented me with a certificate for my work for the Croatian cause. I also visited Croatia in 1998. On that occasion, I was awarded Croatia’s medal of honour.
In November 2000, I undertook an official visit. By this time, President Tudjman had died and Mr Stipe Mesic had been elected President of Croatia. There had been a significant political shift and Croatia had now changed through a democratic process to a government without the HDZ. The new government also showed great respect for my work. In a televised meeting at the presidential palace, President Mesic greeted me and personally thanked me for the work that I had done for Croatia and the Croatian people over the years, and he said that “the Croatian nation will never forget the contribution which you have made, nor will I”.
You asked about my impressions of Croatia in those years. In the first years after independence, President Tudjman tried to reform Croatia towards a modern democracy. However he was much preoccupied with the continuing struggle in Bosnia, where the conflict became disastrous – with tens of thousands of people killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. It was important for the Croatian community in Bosnia to be protected. In the end the ‘peace’ that was achieved through the Dayton agreement was very fragile and the tensions in Bosnia continued until Dr Tudjman died and indeed continue to this day.
It seems that, in the final years of the reign of President Tudjman, some developments took place involving certain people and policies, which led the Croatian people to vote for a change of government. There are several theories as to why this happened; my knowledge of these issues is limited. As I have indicated under question 7, even today there are serious challenges facing Croatia. However I am very confident that these can be overcome and Croatia can play a significant role in Europe and the world.
10. Significant economic power of the Australian-Croatian diaspora has been proven over and over again through humanitarian aid and purchase of premises across Australia for the establishment of diplomatic/consular missions, not to speak of individual investors of which there have been several. Are there some special tricks do you think that Croatia could pick up on in rejuvenating the strength of its relationship with its diaspora – a relationship that has grown somewhat stale?
I think that it is rather sad that, in view of the fact that the Croatian people in the United States, Canada and Australia made such a contribution to achievement of independence and the creation of the modern nation of Croatia, that the diaspora Croatians have not in recent times been given sufficient roles within the government, the public service, the universities and other structures of the Croatian nation. It should be noted that those countries in Eastern Europe who have given a significant role to their Diasporas have actually strengthened themselves economically, intellectually and at artistic and cultural levels.
What is important in this process is that both sides must respect each other. Diaspora Croatians returning to their original country should respect the sensitivities of the population at home and understand the problems which they face. The Diaspora people must try to ensure that new approaches that they are bringing are explained and are demonstrated as being positive and substantial through real evidence. On the other hand, the people and government within Croatia should acknowledge that often the Diaspora Croatians can bring high levels of skills and knowledge in economics, politics, social development, infrastructure, IT and the Internet. These skills should be accepted as potentially making a substantial contribution to nation; these people generally have enormous goodwill and love for Croatia. The Croatian government can do more to encourage cooperation and dialogue between the Croatian Diaspora (especially Australian Croatians) and the people in the home country. In this way, Croatians around the world can help the nation overcome its current problems and look forward to a much brighter future.
From left: Mr Marko Franovic (a distinguished Sydney based businessman), Ina Vukic and Dr Andrew Theophanous
Sydney, June 2016
INA:Is there anything you would like to add with regards to your work for Croatian independence, or perhaps a message for people of Croatian descent living abroad?
ANDREW:I have already spoken above about the struggle for Croatian independence and I have also made some suggestions, which I believe can assist in the further development of Croatia. My message to people of Croatian descent living abroad (especially in Australia) is: firstly try to do whatever you can within the context of multicultural Australia to continue to support and develop the Croatian culture here. In so doing, it is important to teach the children about the great heritage and culture of Croatia – which goes back a thousand years. Croatia has remarkable a remarkable history over all those years; there are many wonderful archaeological sites and many stories that can be told about Croatia. This lovely country has developed its distinctive music, its art and literature and its great leaders with their amazing achievements. In my view, Croatian Australians should take advantage of the many forums that are available within multicultural Australia to promote their distinctive culture and heritage. The cultural diversity of Australia already encompasses Croatian culture; but this must be further acted upon.
Secondly, Croatian Australians can play a bigger role in promoting links between Australia and Croatia. Furthermore, as I have already indicated in my previous answer, the Diaspora can play a very significant role in supporting Croatia by taking their skills and their knowledge back to the original homeland; not only can they contribute their skills, they can also transfer their capital and build new enterprises there.
I want to thank Ina Vukic for this interview. I have fond memories of all that I have shared together with the Croatian community. Now that I am living in Sydney, I look forward to reconnecting with the Croatian community here. As I have said for so many years: Živjela Hrvatska. (Long Live Croatia)
Distributed ON 18 JULY 1998
In April this year, I paid my first visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1991. At this earlier time, I had been on an important visit there three weeks before the war broke out at the end of 1991. The circumstances of that visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina were very interesting. In August 1991, I had visited Croatia at the invitation of President Tudjman because I was then President of the Australian Parliamentarians Group for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. During that dramatic visit to Zagreb, I received a phone call from President Izetbegovic in Sarajevo who invited me to attend the first National Conference of the Muslim Party, the SDA in December 1991 and to discuss with him in detail what was happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was thus that I decided to embark on a mission visiting Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia in order to see whether there was any hope of a peaceful resolution.
Besides Sarajevo, I visited Belgrade, Zagreb and Lubjiana, and spoke with President Tudjman and President Kucan respectively, as well as many other leaders. In all of these meetings, the view was pessimistic about preventing a war, unless there was involvement by the international community.
As it turned out, I was the only western MP at the conference in Sarajevo. At that time, I had discussions with all three parties of the Bosnian conflict, with Izetbegovic himself, with the Croatian parties and Mr Karadzic, the Serbian leader. In all this, I was looking at whether there was any possibility of finding some way that would have prevented a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
After all these discussions, I became very frightened about the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it seemed they were heading towards the possibility of a dreadful war. On 4 December 1991, I issued a statement in Zagreb which was also issued in Australia and which warned: “the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was in danger of exploding into a bloody civil war far worse than Croatia, unless the international community acted quickly to solve the crisis". I then referred to the discussions that I had had and made the following observations:
“The Serbian leader, Mr Karadzic has made it perfectly clear to me that the Yugoslav army will act on behalf of the Serbian community, in the event that President Izetbegovic declares an independent republic. The Serbian community is implacably opposed to independence and will use all means to remain within Yugoslavia.
On the other hand, President Izetbegovic seems determined in his resolve to free Bosnia Herzegovina from what he perceives to be the domination of the Serbian communist authorities.
In this situation, a severe confrontation seems inevitable, with many people caught up in the fighting. I fear for them”.
Ethnic Cleansing and the Tragedy of the Refugees
Unfortunately the events which ensued were more bloody and barbarous than even I had feared. Within months, following the declaration of independence by President Izetbegovic, the world witnessed a tragic civil war with hundreds of thousands of people killed, tens of thousands of people tortured and raped, more than a million people displaced, either within the state itself, or in many countries outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This outrageous situation was allowed to continue as we witnessed the inability of the international community to do very much about the crisis. The failure of the United Nations and the European powers on this issue was comprehensive; there was a failure to achieve any kind of negotiated settlement and a failure to do anything to protect innocent people from attack on the ground.
The deadly and terrible doctrine of ethnic cleansing was put into practice in a way that should shame us--the whole international community. The tribulations that the refugees suffered themselves tell a story of horror unparalleled since the Second World War. I personally witnessed some of the refugees revealing these tragedies when I visited the Bosnian refugee camps in Slovenia, Hungary and Croatia in August 1992. Upon my return from that visit, I wrote a letter to the Australian Prime Minister in which I made the following observations:
“I spent several hours talking to the refugees at these camps. 1 am shocked at the stories of brutality, torture and human degradation, which they told.
Some of these people had escaped from the concentration camps in Bosnia, which have been shown worldwide on television. Others had been herded into railway carriages, which had been previously used by cattle, transported to the edges of the Republic and forced at the point of a gun to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Women told of stories where they and their teenage daughters had been raped. Many people were eyewitnesses to cold-blooded murder of civilians, including children.
One group of women and children were separated from their husbands, who were taken to the concentration camps, while they were then raped and put on a truck and sent towards the border of Croatia.
These traumatised and abandoned people are now in over crowded refugee camps in Croatia, Slovenia and Hungary.
However these three nations have struggling economies and are finding it increasingly difficult to cope with the pressure of the refugees. The leaders of each of these nations have called on the international community for additional help with the refugees. Every Minister and official that I spoke with on the crisis repeated this plea for assistance.
Because of these representations, I am writing to you to seek additional assistance from the Australian Government. I believe that we should consider some way of supplementing our monetary assistance by directly channelling funds and, if possible, some supplies to the people living in these camps. In addition, I believe that our Government should consider extending the humanitarian component of the refugee program to include more people from Bosnia Herzegovina, especially people with relatives in Australia and extremely needy cases such as abandoned children”.
On 26 November that year, I spoke on a motion in the Parliament on Bosnia -Herzegovina. This is part of what I said:
“I have seen Bosnian refugees throughout Europe; I have seen camps in Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia. When one sees, as I have seen, what these people have been through and hear the stories that they tell, one wonders how far humanity has progressed since the time of the Nazis.
There are terrible stories of atrocities. There are stories of innocent people being butchered, of groups of people being lined up and shot, of people being decapitated and of gross tortures. These things should not be occurring at this point in the twentieth century, and especially not in Europe. I do not think the plight of these people has penetrated sufficiently into the international consciousness. We ought to be doing as much as we can.
However, a solution must be found, and we need to exercise a lot more effort at the diplomatic level to force people to the negotiating table to discuss a real solution. It is not good enough to say that the people in that region just want to kill each other. That has not always been the case. It is not true, especially in Bosnia Herzegovina, which, until the recent outbreak, was a model of the three peoples living together in peace and in harmony. Intermarriage between Croatians, Muslims and Serbians was at a very high level for three different ethnic communities.
What is at stake in relation to Bosnia-Herzegovina extends far beyond Bosnia-Herzegovina; it extends to the whole question of the integrity of the various religious groups in the world in terms of dealing with crises of this kind”.
In 1995, I opened at the Australian High court Gallery in Canberra - an art exhibition on the tragedy of Bosnia and Herzegovina titled "Sarajevo Ninety two". At that time I made the following observations:
“As we speak here today, the tragedy and the terror continues. In the last few days, Srebrenica and Zepa have fallen to Bosnian Serb forces creating tens of thousands of new refugees.
For, while thousands of Moslems forced from their homes, in the eastern Bosnian enclave of Srebrencia by victorious Serb forces last Tuesday, were bussed west to government-held territory, as many as 5,000 more, mainly men, are being held prisoner by the Serbs, according to Bosnian authorities
Meanwhile, the big powers and the international community as a whole cannot agree on what to do. When we look at this exhibition here today, we can hear the cry for help from the people of Bosnia Herzegovina. It is incumbent on us to do whatever we can to heed that call”.
The Dayton Accord and the Problems of Implementation
The tragedy of Srebrenica finally led the international community into action. The United States and NATO decided to intervene to stop the fighting and the UN became more heavily involved. After much political argument a peace agreement was reached in Dayton, following the intervention of President Clinton. President Tudjman of Croatia, President Izetbegovic of Bosnia and President Milosovic of Serbia signed this agreement. The Dayton Agreement sought to achieve a resolution of the conflict within the context of one Federal Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
On the one hand, the Dayton Agreement made concessions to the divisions in Bosnia- Herzegovina by establishing separate zones, each governed by the distinct ethnic groups; on the other hand, it established a national government and a federal administration which could break down ethnic barriers. The Dayton Agreement divided Bosnia-Herzegovina so: 49% of the area was given to the Serbian State, within the federal nation, this was called the “Republica Srpska”. The remaining 51% of the area went to the so-called “Federation”; in which you have together, Muslims and Croatians. However, whereas the Serbian State is very centralised in its organisation, the Federation of Muslims and Croats is divided up into ten cantons, and each canton has its own government. Some cantons are primarily Croatian, some are primarily Muslim, and some are mixed Muslim and Croatian populations.
Hence, the aim of the Dayton Accord has been to try to establish a nation based on recognising ethnic separateness in the first instance; but moving then to restore a multi-ethnic society by getting rid of the influences of ethnic cleansing, and excessive nationalism and thereby to bringing people back together. Now, the key section of the Dayton Accord in this regard is Annex 7. This Annex 7 is what most current issues are about, in terms of the continuing conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is because Annex 7 refers to the agreement on refugees and misplaced persons. The gist of Annex 7 is this: as the process of reconciliation proceeds, people should be able to return back to their original homes, or to the same place as their original homes, if they so desire. In other words, it is to undo the consequences of ethnic cleansing.
The international community and especially of European Union and United States are committed to the Dayton Accord. However, the progress of the idea of Annex 7, since the signing of the Dayton Accord, has been slow. This is not surprising, given all the hatreds created by the war: the pressure to return refugees is being driven especially by Germany; it has paid, according to various estimates, up to A$17 billion for Bosnian refugees. Germany is now in a situation where it has said “enough is enough” in terms of the payments for Bosnian refugees; it wants to return these refugees back to Bosnia. That has meant that it wants an acceleration of the pace of return under Annex 7.
In the meantime, however, obviously the Serbians are saying they are not ready to accept Muslims back into their fold, and also a situation has arisen with the Croatians, not surprisingly, resisting the return of Serbian refugees to Croatia.
In my visit in April this year, I had discussions with senior people in Germany, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on the current state of affairs, including the pace of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. In particular, in Germany I met Dr Christian Schwatch-Schilling, who is the International Mediator for Bosnia-Herzegovina. His job is to try and get the various communities working together inside each of the constituent units of Bosnia-Herzegovina. His job and that of his assistant is basically to go around from canton to canton, from place to place, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and try to ensure that everyone’s rights are respected--especially their political rights, in the formation of local and state governments.
Dr Schilling is acutely aware of the way each side is playing these issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This also became clear to me, after my discussions in the region, including with the Foreign Ministers of Croatia, Mr Mate Granic and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, (who is the Muslim representative in the trio of Foreign Ministers), Dr Huso Zivalj. Unfortunately, there has been a significant slowing in the process of the implementation of the Dayton Accord, especially with Annex 7.
The Deputy Foreign Minister in Sarajevo explained the Muslim Bosnian position on Annex 7 to me in April. Their position on Annex 7 is the core of the Dayton Peace Agreement. They claim that Annex 7, 'that every effort be made to return all persons to their original homes before the war', basically requires that every effort be made to reintroduce ethnic mixing, even though there has been a division of the country into the two zones. The aim is to achieve a multi ethnic Bosnia by returning people to their homes. Mr Zivalj stressed that the Bosnian Government wants to see the return of the approximately two hundred thousand (200,000) remaining refugees in Germany who are from Bosnia-Herzegovina. He stressed that the key problem has been that many Serbs have left the Krajina region of Croatia, also approximately two hundred thousand (200,000) are not able at this particular time to return to Croatia, so they are being housed in places like Banja Luka within Republika Srpska. These houses originally belonged to Croatians and Muslims. So, the Muslim leadership claims that unless these people are shifted back to Croatia, then there will not be a sufficient room for the return of the refugees from Germany, nor will there be sufficient possibilities in terms of moving people back to the different parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina from which they originated.
Obviously, Karadzic and the others had hoped that there would come a time when Bosnia-Herzegovina would break up as a nation and Republika Srpska would be joined to Serbia. They still hope that one day this will come; this hope feeds on the process of failure to achieve sufficient reconciliation. The aim of these people is to frustrate the international community so that they will give up and come to accept that the partition of Bosnia is inevitable.
Notwithstanding this problem, the Contact Group is also trying to get movement from within Bosnia-Herzegovina itself, so that those Serbian people (who are living in Republica Srpska, but were originally from Sarajevo) are able to return to that city; this would in turn allow those Muslim people, who are now living in Sarajevo, to return to their original villages in Republica Srpska.
The whole future of Bosnia-Herzegovina will come to a crunch in September of this year, when under the Dayton Agreement, there will be elections at every level above local government in Bosnia-Herzegovina--that is within the two states, (“the Federation” and “Republika Srpska”) and for the national parliament and government. These elections are controversial, because their outcome will determine whether Bosnia will move towards a multi-ethnic state or whether it will remain divided.
As you may know, in the last elections, what happened was that in Republika Srpska, the supporters of Karadzic took all the seats in the Federal Parliament. As a result of that, the Serbian representatives in the Federal Parliament have refused to take their seats ever since that first election under the Dayton Accord. So the Federal Parliament has been operating without the Serbian representatives.
Positive Signs for the Future of a United Bosnia
This agenda of Karadzic’s recently received significant setbacks. He personally has been removed and his Party is no longer in the Government of the Republika of Srpska. A reformer, Mr Dodjic, has managed to achieve the Prime Ministership of the Republika Srpska with the support of a multi ethnic Coalition within that Parliament. He has been able to bring together various moderate Serbs, Croatians and Muslims within that region and to form one government. One of the very big questions facing Bosnia-Herzegovina in September is: whether this reform program in Republika Srpska will be able to continue or whether Dodjic will be brought down by the Karadzic forces and other ethnic chauvinists?
The Muslim led Government seems very committed to this idea of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multi ethnic country. It was interesting to me during my visit that the Muslims appeared to have made a large number of concessions in order to achieve this result. In particular, for example, they have agreed to rotate in all positions of power: at the Federal level amongst all three ethnicities; the State level within “the Federation” between Muslims and Croatians. Indeed, the Prime Minister, Mr Bicakcic explained to me that he had done everything to work together with the Croatians and to put into place a system that is designed to ensure greater multi-ethnic participation.
`There is optimism about the outcome of the election in September, as expressed to me by the Chairman of the Federal Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr Avdo Campara. In my discussion with him, he spoke about the fact that the Parliament had not been fully operative, because only the Croatian and the Muslim Bosnian representatives were attending. As I have indicated, at the earlier election there had been a tremendous impact from Karadzic and his forces, and all the then elected representatives were opposed to a cooperative process with the structures put in place under the Dayton Accord.
Mr Campara felt that the Parliament had been severely hampered by the fact that the Serbians who had been loyal to Karadzic, and who had been elected at a time earlier than the election of Mr Dodjic, had not participated in Parliamentary proceedings. He felt that there were extremists in the Serbian side (and some Croatians) who were responsible for much of the blockage to Bosnia-Herzegovina being a unified state.
However, Mr Campara was hopeful that after the September elections, there would definitely be a number of representatives, (perhaps even the majority) from Republika Srpska who would be agreeable to participate in the united Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was very confident in fact that at least some such representatives would arise. The question is whether those would be sufficient to really make an impact on the general political processes of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Parliament? He was hoping that this would be the case.
Mr Campara and I also discussed the role and actions of the High Representative to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr Woldendorf. He had the power to intervene to try and achieve a more ethnically mixed result; especially where there had been actions that were contrary to the spirit of the Dayton Accord. In exercising this power, he had on occasion imposed his will on certain Mayors, councillors of certain municipalities and even on the leaders of some cantons, where there had been activities which in his view had been contrary to the principles of the Dayton Agreement. For example, he had acted to overturn several attempts by some groups to exclude representatives of other ethnic groups in the participation of the political processes, or to treat them unfairly with respect to the administration of policies, such as housing, return of refugees, employment and the like.
Goodwill from Leaders and International Support
Another positive factor has been the good will that the Prime Minister of the Federation, Mr Bicakcic, has recently developed in the relationship between himself and Mr Dodjic, the reformist Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska. Questions on returnees to the Republika Srpska, on multi-ethnic elections and on better relationships between the Republic of Srpska and the Federation are all extremely important issues in their discussions.
This goodwill by the leaders has meant that some changes can be achieved, irrespective of the pressures from Serbia and Mr Milosevic. The Muslim view appears to be one of encouraging Mr Dodjic and hoping that his general approach will become dominant in the Republika Srpska. In any event, Mr Bicakcic and Mr Dodjic have, through their goodwill so far, helped to solidify the nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The question now is whether Mr Milosevic and other hard line Serbian leaders are going to allow this experiment to proceed, or whether they are going to try to get rid of Mr Dodjic, and whether they will succeed.
From my observations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the people who are most enthusiastic to make this nation work as a multi-ethnic society are the Bosnian Muslims. I must say, I was generally impressed with the leadership and the Muslim people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Before I went there, I heard much propaganda from the various sources saying that they are all becoming fundamentalists, and that they are being influenced too much by Iran, and hardline Arabic states.
This was an issue that I raised with the Chairman of the Parliament, Mr Campara. I referred to the fact that many of the critics of the Muslim leadership in the Government, were people who felt that the Bosnian Muslims were turning to a form of fundamentalism. He replied that any observer of the situation could see that this was not the case, especially in Sarajevo, which was the main Muslim centre. He admitted that it is true that some people, to protect themselves, had turned to more devotion to their religion than had been the case in the past, but it did not follow from this that they had become fundamentalists, or that they were pursuing more extreme forms of Islam. On the contrary, he felt that the Bosnian Muslim people were essentially European in character, that they were concerned with the moderate pursuit of their religion and that they wanted to differentiate their life from extreme forms of Islamic religion. Mr Campara felt that those who were putting forward the opposite view, were people who wanted to smear the Muslim leadership and to try and undermine the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
I must say that my own observations in Sarajevo support the view that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina are very Europeanised Muslims. The people, in their dress and in their activities, are clearly very western and European. For example, the Muslim women wear Western dress, without the usual fundamentalist restrictions.
The good faith of the Muslims seems also to be supported by the following facts: In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims are the majority--not an absolute majority, but about 45%--the Serbians are about 34% and the rest are Croatians. Yet, they have agreed to a Federal government in which every single position in government is rotated, including the Presidency of the country, between the three groups. For example, Mr Zivalj is from the majority, but he accepts the fact that the Foreign Minister at the moment is a Croatian, and next year it will be a Serbian. This rotation amongst the groups occurs at every level, right to Ambassadorships. At the federal level, all the positions in the bureaucracy are shared and/or rotated.
To accept equality of that kind is the substantial concession that the Bosnian Muslims made to achieve the Dayton Accord. I believe that they are committed to keeping Bosnia-Herzegovina together. Unfortunately, there is the view amongst their leadership, that both Croatia and Serbia wish to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it is only because of the Dayton Accord that this was prevented from happening. I do not believe this is true; however, it was disturbing that I continuously heard this view at the highest level of the Muslim representatives in the government.
The partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not the desired position of the international community. Consider the consequences of a partition. It would mean that the territory of Republika Srpska would go to Serbia, sections of the Herzegovina region would go to Croatia, and you would have a small section left which would constitute the geographical basis of a Muslim mono-ethnic state within Europe. That actually is not a desirable goal of the international community, which clearly supports the idea of a multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most countries have recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina as a UN state; they seek to support the Dayton Accord, including sorting out the issues represented under Annex 7 – that is the return of refugees and misplaced persons. The European Union and the Americans are especially determined to try and achieve these results.
The American determination to implement the Dayton Accord
This was reinforced in my mind by a long meeting at the American Embassy in Sarajevo where I met with Mr Mark Tokola, who is the Chief Political Counsellor. His view was that the United States had achieved a great deal with the Dayton Accord, and that now there was generally peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that people were getting back to their ordinary lives and that the next step was the achievement of greater ethnic intermixing through the implementation of the refugee return program. He admitted that the return program was not moving along at a pace which the Americans had hoped, but nevertheless, given that the bitterness that had been created by the war, the progress was reasonable satisfactory and in some places, surprisingly good. Already a number of mixed Councils had been elected and, within the cantons of “the Federation”, there were mixed governments with mixed levels of cooperation.
The emergence of Mr Dodjic as Prime Minister of Republika Srpska has certainly given everybody heart about the possibilities about a breakthrough in relation to the Serbian participation. The Americans applauded the cooperation between him and Mr Bicakcic, the Prime Minister of “the Federation”, which was creating a basis for greater unity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, the US believed that there could emerge a working central Government for Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole. This was still some way off, but the United States was determined to succeed in this matter and will continue to pursue its goals.
The United States and the Contact Group as a whole were determined to see that the elections in September in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be free and fair; hence the Opposition Parties must be able to put their points of view. They hoped that multi party governments would arise at the States level and at the Federal level. Mr Tokola was very confident that, after these elections, the situation would improve quite substantially and there would be a positive future for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nevertheless, there was still significant numbers of extremists which were against the real achievement of a multi ethnic society and it did not pay to underestimate the impact of these forces. Bosnia-Herzegovina was thus at a critical point and would face a really key moment at the elections in September.
Hence, notwithstanding the optimism, there are also dangers in the current situation.
Dr Schilling is concerned that the elections in September may show a reaction by many citizens to the pressure from the international community and consequently we may find that the chauvinists, like the Karadzic forces, will emerge strong again. One suggestion that he makes is that the electoral process needs to be changed in some way between now and September, to make room for opposition parties and parties that are committed to the process of reconciliation, and to a united Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Most people that I spoke to believe that September will be a watershed for Bosnia-Herzegovina. It could emerge from September that we could have moderate governments, and have a process which supports the international community’s aims for a multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina, or it could emerge that people vote along extremely chauvinist lines, therefore making it more difficult to achieve what was intended under the Dayton Agreement. If the latter is the case, the international community will be faced with a crisis as to what to do next in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
ADDITIONAL NOTE in 2024 : Years have passed and the situation in Bonia remains tense. Even though Milosevic and Karadzic are gone, there continues to be problems – because the Serbs in Bosnia are not yet wishing to fully participate fully in the Federal Government . Nevertheless progress has been made and Bosnia Herzegovina as a nation has secured recognition throughout the International Community
Excerpt from Andrew’s book UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL JUSTICE, AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE This excerpt sets out Andrew’s theory of Social Justice and the implementation of Social Justice in Australia
Here is CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Social justice as a concept, has been widely used both within political circles and the broad welfare community. Although it gained popular appeal in the late 1980's, its foundations have been with us for a long time. It has been tied in with our notions of a 'fair go' or 'fair deal'. The term 'social justice' is used by people holding a range of political and philosophical points of view. In recent times in Australia however, the term social justice has been used extensively to refer to a set of key policies at the core of the program of the current Australian Federal Labor Government.
Most people have an intuitive understanding of the meaning of the terms fairness, justice and equality. The difficulty arises when one attempts to move beyond these general intuitive ideas to a more specific and concrete concept of social justice in order to understand how it may be applied in practice. In this second edition of Understanding Social Justice, I will attempt to develop a comprehensive and concrete concept of social justice.
Ronald Mendelsohn (1982), in his analysis of the welfare state, outlines some of the issues that need to be considered when one looks at what is meant by social justice:
When people advocate social, sexual, political or economic equality, do they mean absolute or qualified equality? If equality is qualified, to what extent would they permit or even encourage inequalities?...Certainly people's variation age, sex, physical and mental capacities as well as in social and economic fortune and upbringing, encourage inequality. Should we be satisfied if people have an equal start in life but finish up greatly unequal? How do you ensure that the son of a judge and the daughter of a tribal Aboriginal have an equal start in life?
1. The questions raised here are perennial: they have arisen throughout human history whenever persons have reflected on the moral basis of society and how to achieve fairness in social relations.
In the Australian context, the matter of definition has been made more urgent by the fact that the Keating Federal Government is further developing a social justice agenda by setting policy objectives to take us into the next century. In 1990, the Deputy Prime Minister, Brian Howe, claimed: "The new Social Justice Agenda will focus on the medium and longer term social policy issues which will help forge Australia's character in the lead-up to the year 2000."2 This objective has been further reinforced in a number of reports and policy initiatives. By the time of the 1994 budget social justice policy was perceived as facing a number of significant challenges. Brian Howe refers to these challenges thus:
The ageing of the Australian population, the changing nature of Australia's cities and regions. Environmental protection and sustaining the levels of economic growth that contribute to our relatively high standard of living will continue to place pressure on the economic and social structures of our society. The Government looks forward to meeting these challenges in partnership with all members of the Australian community, respecting the rights and responsibilities of Australian citizens and promoting equal access to opportunities that will contribute to a better quality of life.
3. In addition to the imperatives arising from the Government's emphasis on social justice, there is another reason why it is important to gain a more clear and comprehensive concept of social justice. Australian society, like all other Western, liberal democratic societies, is experiencing fundamental economic and social transition. In particular, the massive restructuring of industry and employment as a result of economic globalisation, will have lasting effects on social cohesion. Furthermore, social change has taken place with the increase in cultural diversity of the Australian population.
This makes the next decade a crucial one in terms of social policy. There has to be a recognition that social policy can no longer be considered as adjunct to economic policy. Rather, it will play a crucial role in the establishment of new bases for social cohesion and solidarity. A concept of social justice which is relevant to modern society must take account of these changes. It must show how it is possible to achieve a fair and just society in the context of an increasingly integrated and competitive international economic system. It must also show how a unitary concept of social justice can apply to the diversity of views and beliefs that characterise a multicultural society like Australia.
My aim in this book is firstly to develop such a comprehensive concept through an extended philosophical and theoretical discussion of the Western tradition of social justice. Secondly, to evaluate the current situation in Australian society, (and in particular the performance of the Federal Labor Government), on the basis of the comprehensive concept. Thirdly, I wish to suggest ways in which action by governments and by individuals within society can, and should, be directed towards a more just social structure. The achievement of this goal would introduce into Australian society a more active idea of citizenship and a much greater sense of community.
Developing the Theory of Social Justice
Part A and Part B of this book are concerned with the development of a comprehensive concept of social justice. Before outlining our approach here, it is worth considering a sceptical question which might be raised: Why do we need a theory of justice? Indeed why do we need such a social and political theory at all?
Those who have raised this problem, often see theory as an abstract and nebulous idea that has little to offer those who are interested in tangible outcomes and practical policies. The importance of theory should not, however, be so lightly negated. Theory is not just for academics, nor is the examination of it merely an exercise in 'navel gazing'.
Values and priorities underpin every decision a government makes, whether it be in the economic or social sphere. Underpinning these values and priorities is a conceptual framework which guides our thought and action. The aim of good political and social theories is to articulate that framework and place it within the broader context of our thinking about ourselves and the world.
Conversely, we cannot be clear about what it is we want to achieve and why we want to achieve it in society, unless we have a clear theoretical framework that we draw upon in pursuing our goals in society.
The clearer we are about our political theory, including our theory of justice, the more clearly we will be able to understand our actions and to set our general social and political priorities. Indeed it could be argued that such a theory is necessary for us to have any understanding of our place in the social world.
Part A (Chapters II, III and IV) of the book thus begins with an outline and analysis of the historical development of the modern concept of social justice. I begin with a consideration of the very early foundations of social justice. To do this I refer to Plato's Republic which distinguishes between justice and goodness. I then examine Immanuel Kant's theory of respect for persons and show how it forms the basis for any shared concept of social justice. In the final section of the chapter I refer to Rousseau to show how he developed the Kantian theory into a model for democracy.
Having considered the foundations of a theory of justice, in Chapter III I go on to give an account of how these early theories were used by different schools to construct a model for social justice in modern society. In particular, I examine the approach taken by J. S. Mill, the Orthodox Marxist approach and the social democratic tradition. Finally in Chapter III, I show how the idea of welfare and social rights emerged from these traditions in the post-war period in Western society.
The theories discussed in Part A provide an important launching pad for my attempt to articulate and support the comprehensive concept of social justice, which is the aim of Part B of the book. In doing this, I draw on the work of the eminent American philosopher, John Rawls and his treatise A Theory of Justice.
4. Hence in Chapter V, I proceed by considering Rawls' two principles of justice by demonstrating how his idea of a just social structure can be applied to a modern Western state; this gives an outline of the basic features of a just social structure for a modern society. I then expand the discussion of Rawls' theory by analysing it in the context of the concepts of human rights, citizenship and self respect.
In Chapter VI, I outline the four basic elements of social justice. These are:
(i) a minimum income for all to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to participate fully in society;
(ii) the importance of universal social rights such as, health, education, housing and employment;
(iii) access and equity to all Government services and societal resources for all people regardless of religion, race, gender or ethnic background;
(iv) direct provision of assistance to the most disadvantaged in the community.
In Chapters VII and VIII, I address the question of how this concept of social justice can be universal and apply to a diversity of cultural, religious and philosophical views. Crucial to this comprehensive concept of social justice is the philosophical argument that underpins and justifies it. In modern multicultural societies like Australia, there are competing conceptions of the common good, and therefore, it is necessary to justify and legitimate the idea of a single basic just social structure as outlined by Rawls.
Indeed Rawls himself has taken on this task in recent years. He has published a collection of essays in a book entitled Political Liberalism.5 In this book he defends the view that there can be one universal concept that is the basis for a just social structure. To do this, Rawls now argues that the principles of justice are 'immanent' or 'latent' in the structure of liberal democratic societies, such as the United States of America or Australia.
This is similar to the ideas of Jurgen Habermas who develops the idea that a common concept of social justice can be arrived at when there is full democratic participation of the people, involving genuine discourse on values and purposes. In other words, Habermas argues that the more genuinely democratic a society is, the more there will be a tendency for society to move towards a just social structure. Habermas emphasises the role of social movements as being reflective of a democratic and participatory form of citizenship.
From the arguments of Rawls and Habermas relating to the relationship between social justice and the democratic system, the idea of 'active citizenship' is derived. The objective of active citizenship is to develop a shared and common acknowledgement in the community of what constitutes a just social structure. I argue that the key to developing a shared concept of social justice in a culturally diverse community such as Australia, is the idea of citizenship, and in particular, this idea of active citizenship.
Active citizenship represents the rights as well as the responsibilities that all Australians have to respect and protect the fundamental human rights and dignity of each person. It is an engaging, involving and participatory concept that is directed at 're-activating' the practice of citizenship and recovering the idea of a civic community.
The idea of active citizenship will be developed in this book in response to the 'abstract' nature of the traditional liberal idea of citizenship. According to this more formal definition, citizens have universal civil and political rights that bestow an equal status in the public realm. However, the reality is that citizens do not have an equal opportunity to participate in society. They are often constrained firstly by their socio-economic status, and secondly by factors including ethnicity, gender, age and disability. The idea of active citizenship will emphasise four elements of social justice:
In Chapter IX, I discuss the critical issue of the limits to redistribution and their impact on the possibilities for social justice. There are two sets of such limits: those imposed by the imperatives of the domestic economy based on a market, profit orientated system and those imposed through the operation of the international forces. The latter have become more important with the increasing globalisation of economy, technology and communications. In that chapter, I also explore the limits to economic growth and other restraints imposed because of the existence of environmental rights. I argue that our concept of social justice must be expanded beyond the claims of the current generation to incorporate the hypothetical claims of future generations.
Applying the Concept of Social Justice to Australia
Part C of the book is concerned with applying the comprehensive concept of social justice to analyse the extent to which Australian society is pursuing and achieving the goal of a just social structure. In this context, I will demonstrate how Rawls' theory can give us guidance to the further development of principles and practices of social justice in Australia. My main focus is to apply the comprehensive concept of social justice to an analysis of the policies and achievements of the Australian Labor Government in the last decade. In so doing, I seek to
i) demonstrate that in general terms the policies of the Labor Government are consistent with and directly derivable from the principles of justice as outlined by Rawls, and ii) suggest some further policies and further priorities that might be adopted in the pursuit of a new social justice agenda for the Government.
Before explaining my procedure in those chapters, I wish to address a question that might arise at this juncture: Why should we be concerned with the social justice policy of the Federal Labor Government? At one level the answer is obvious; this is the Government which has been in power since 1983, and that has therefore provided the general direction of national policy in a whole range of social justice areas.
But there is a second point: the concern with social justice has been an integral part of the identity of the Australian Labor Party from its beginnings. Although it has been discussed extensively in more recent times, the idea and practice of social justice has a long history in Australia. It has been important in the development of a number of political movements, including the Australian Labor Party from its beginnings.
As Stuart MacIntyre (1985) says, while reflecting on the history of the Labor movement, "the pursuit of social justice has been a central theme." In his book Winners and Losers (1985), he traces the development of social justice through Australia's political history. In looking at the formation of the Labor Party in the 1890's, he affirms that the Party was based on:
a keen sense of the grievances of working class life - unemployment, poverty, inequalities of circumstances and opportunity. It appreciated the need to combat the power of property with the collective solidarity of the workers. At the same time, it was committed to working within capitalism to soften its effects and remove some of its worst features.
6. This historical position has been reinforced in recent times. Thus, at its most recent National Conference of 1991, the Australian Labor Party re-affirmed this commitment in its Platform Resolutions and Rules:
social justice is the A.L.P's reason for existence. It is a common goal that unites all Party members. Through its objectives, policies and programs, the A.L.P. works to create a fairer society for all...Our attachment to social justice springs from many sources, including democratic socialism... It is broader than the social wage... it seeks to redistribute power, privilege and opportunity, to democratise economic and social life, to protect basic rights and freedoms, and to change the structural causes of inequality.
7. The idea of social justice which has underpinned the historical development of the A.L.P, has generally tended to emphasise four principles. These are outlined in the paper Towards a Fairer Australia: Social Justice Strategy 1992-3, which was jointly endorsed by the Prime Minister, Mr Keating and the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Howe, as follows:
* An equitable distribution of economic resources.
* Equality of civil, legal and industrial rights.
* Fair and equal access to services, such as housing, health and education.
* Opportunity for everyone in terms of personal development and participation in community life and decision making.
8. However, over the last century in Australia, there has been a big change in emphasis as to which principles of social justice are most important.
Thus, the first principle, which emphasises economic equality, has received much less attention in recent years, as the Hawke - Keating Governments - like a number of other democratic governments - have come to accept the important role of market mechanisms in the operation of private enterprise economies. Indeed, there has been an increasing recognition that the production of inequality is inherent in such economic systems, and that the challenge is to develop a concept of social justice which comes to grips with this tendency within the economic system. This principle is not so easy to achieve because there are limits to economic redistribution imposed by the nature of the market system itself. For the moment, we should note that because of this limitation, the emphasis in the last decade has shifted to defining social justice in terms of equality of rights, and access and equity with relation to services.
What then is the record of achievement and the value of the current programs of the Labor Government with respect to social justice. In Towards a Fairer Australia, Mr Keating and Mr Howe committed themselves again to the balance between economic policy and social justice strategy. They refer to the fact that by the time of the election of the Labor Government in 1983, Australia was facing a major economic and social crisis. They went on to say:
The Government responded with wide ranging social and economic reforms. It was determined to see Australia adjust to a rapidly changing environment rather than be left behind, and determined that its economic strategies would be firmly grounded in principles of social justice. Its goal was to open up to all the opportunities for personal development and employment and community participation that were still denied to many. It was determined to remove the barriers associated with race, gender, class and language. Nearly a decade on, much has been achieved, in providing adequate income support, in support for the aged and people with disabilities, in putting integrity back into the taxation system, in opening educational opportunities for the children of low income and disadvantaged families, in providing universal health cover at an affordable price, in helping migrants to adjust to Australian life, in removing barriers faced by women, and in giving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders much more control over their own destinies.
9. Action to Achieve Social Justice
Having surveyed the specific social justice policies and their impact in Australia, I turn in the final section to consider what directions we should pursue as individuals and within governments the prospects of achieving greater social justice and more active citizenship in Australia, and what directions we as a society should encourage in seeking the goal of the just social structure. In Chapter XVII, I examine whether it is realistically possible to achieve this goal of embedding greater social justice into Australian society. Thus, in the first section I discuss the extent to which civil and political rights - as a precondition for social justice - are present and supported in Australian society.
I then examine two matters that are raised as obstacles to achieving social justice in Australia: (i) the policies and attitudes of the Liberal - National Opposition parties, especially the New Right agenda which they have adopted in the last decade, and (ii) the problem of lack of participation in the political process of women, NESB people and indigenous people. I argue that while these two factors create serious problems for advancing social justice in Australia, they can be overcome.
In Part C of this Chapter, I discuss two positive elements which make social justice a more real possibility in our society. First, the Accord between the Trade Union movement and the Government is examined and shown to have provided a general consensus within the economic system. Second, multiculturalism as a phenomenon has provided a significant basis for social cohesion in our culturally diverse society. Yet, inherent in multiculturalism, is the concept of social justice including social rights.
Thus, in the final section of this chapter, I argue that the comprehensive concept of social justice should form the basis of unity in our multicultural Australia. In Chapters VII and VIII, I have argued that this is a theoretical possibility; I now wish to argue that it should be embodied in the practical policy of the Australian government and parliament. Furthermore, I argue that it is logical to incorporate the ideals of multiculturalism into an idea of citizenship which also encompasses this comprehensive concept of social justice. The idea of active citizenship would thus incorporate both the ideals of multiculturalism and the comprehensive concept of social justice.
In the final chapter, I discuss what the individual and governments need to do to further embed the principles of social justice into Australian society. I discuss this issue in two ways.
Firstly, the way in which the individual may seek to achieve social justice through action directed at a number of levels of social and political structure. There are four levels of society towards which such action to achieve social justice needs to be directed. These are (a) seeking to change the unjust policies and actions of a government, (b) seeking to change a government which is unjust, (c) seeking to embody social justice in the practices of other social movements and groupings in society, and (d) seeking to secure social justice in other nations as an active international citizen.
Secondly, the factors that can, and do, lead the government to pursue policies and actions based on social justice and the problems which it encounters in such a pursuit. There are three aspects of this:
(i) the extent to which a government is committed to social justice; In general, I argue that the Federal Labor Government has attempted to meet its social justice commitments. This is especially the case in its 1994/95 Budget which has provided significant spending to pursue its main priority in social justice terms; that is, to create jobs especially for the long-term unemployed, while at the same time maintaining its welfare and social services.
(ii) The extent to which a government is able to balance the constraints imposed on it and on the nation by international forces, on the one hand and the need to sustain the level of welfare and redistribution required for social justice on the other. In this context, I discuss the need for a wise and good government to be able to differentiate between reasonable and unreasonable international demands and constraints.
(iii) Notwithstanding their achievements, I argue that the ALP and the government have a number of further significant social justice goals to achieve. I discuss ways in which to establish a political agenda for future action. In this regard, in September 1994 the ALP National Conference in Hobart is likely to adopt a substantial new proposal for social justice that includes this idea of active citizenship. This is likely to include the idea of setting national social benchmarks with respect to the four elements of Social Justice, including rights to employment, education, health, housing and minimum income.
In conclusion, the pursuit of social justice in society should not be centred solely around ensuring that the actions of the state or government are fair and just. Active citizenship and social justice principles should effuse all aspects of our social, political and economic relations. I conclude that a thoroughgoing understanding of the principles of social justice and of the just social structure can and should create within us, as individuals, a passion to pursue these worthy goals in our own life.
This book can be read in a number of ways. For those interested in avoiding the lengthy discussion of the historical development of social justice, and who wish to go straight into the analysis of the comprehensive concept, I suggest that they start with Chapter V; the outline and discussion of Rawls' theory and proceed to Chapter VI which presents the basic elements of social justice. It is then possible to move to Chapter IX where the important issue of the limits to redistribution is discussed. The reader can then proceed to the remaining chapters.
For those interested in the inter-relationship between the historical development of the concept of social justice and the current debates in social theory, I suggest beginning with Part A and proceeding to Chapters V, VII and VIII together with the Appendix.
Readers who are interested in the contemporary debates on social justice theory, I recommend a study of the whole of Part B (Chapters V-IX) together with the Appendix and the concluding two chapters of the book.
For those readers interested in avoiding the analysis of the current Australian situation, and proceeding directly from theory to action, I suggest beginning with Part B and moving directly to Chapters XVII and XVIII. Of course, there is always the option of following my procedure as set out in the book!
NOTES:
1. R. Mendelsohn, Fair Go: Welfare issues in Australia, Penguin, Australia 1982, p. 9
2. "Federal Government to set Social Justice Agenda", The Hon Brian Howe, Deputy Prime Minister, Media Release, 30th June 1993
3. Social Justice Statement, 1994 -1995, AGPS, Canberra, 1994, p. iii
4. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, Mass., 1972
5. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Colombia University Press, New York, 1993
6. S. Macintyre, Winners and Losers, Allen & Unwin, Australia 1985 p.51
7. Australian Labor Party, Platform Resolutions and Rules 1991, p.209
8. Towards a Fairer Australia: Social Justice Strategy 1992-1993, Canberra, AGPS, p.3
9. "Towards A Fairer Australia", op.cit., p.3
10. P. Travers and S. Richardson, Living Decently: Material Well-Being in Australia, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1993
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